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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
Clt,:\IO CALI>WELL and ROBERT 
1~~- (\)\ .. LX{;rrox, dba CALDWELL 
.£\ND COVINGrr,ON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
~\_X SCHUTZ DRILLING COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation 
Defendant and Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REI-IEARING 
.._\ppeal fro1n the Judgn1ent of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court for Uintah County, Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHE)ARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
The petition of the respondent, Anschutz Drilling 
( 
10lnpany, Inc., respectfully shows to the Honorable 
Supre1ne Court: 
1. The above entitled court filed its opinion herein 
in favor of appellant and against respondent on April 3, 
1962. 
2. By order of the court duly entered herein, upon 
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good cause shown and pursuant to Rule 76 (e) (4), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the time in which respondent 
may petition for a rehearing has been extended to and 
including the date of the filing thereof. 
3. It is respectfully alleged that the court, by its 
opinion and decision aforesaid, erred on the following 
points, to-wit: 
(A) The court erred in failing to rule favorably, or 
to rule at all, upon respondent's contention that in this 
action for specific performance the plaintiffs are required 
to prove every element of their alleged contract by clear 
and convincing evidence, and in failing to apply that 
rule of law in weighing the evidence submitted by 
plaintiff. (See pages 21 and 22 of respondent's original 
brief.) 
(B) The court erred in ruling and deciding, as 
a matter of law, (as the court apparently does in the 
third paragraph on page 2 of its opinion) that, if 
respondent offered to contract with appellants and 
waived time requirement for acceptance, appellants 
"would then be entitled to a reasonable time to execute 
the contract and 1nake the down payment" \Yithout 
regard to the revocation of the offer before acceptance 
\\·as co1npleted in the n1anner required. 
(C) The court erred in ruling and finding that 
appellants' agent Alloway offered to sign the contract 
for his principal before the respondent's offer \Yas 
\vithdnt\vn, (page 2, paragraphs one and four of the 
opinion) for the reason that the same is entirely 
unsupported by the evidence. 
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(D) The court erred in ruling that respondent's 
offer \\Tas, or could be accepted without tender of delivery 
of the signed contract and tender of delivery of a 
ePrtified check or its equivalent. 
\\TI-IEI~EFORE Respondent prays that this action 
be reheard by this Honorable Court, and that said errors 
be corrected, and that such other order be entered as 
1nay be just. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Staternents as to the kind of case involved, the 
disposition in the lower court, and the relief sought by 
the respective parties on appeal, are all outlined in the 
original briefs herein and in the court's opinion, so it is 
deerned unnecessary to repeat them. 
It is also believed that respondent's statement of 
facts in its original brief was reasonably comprehensive 
and the facts there stated will not have to be repeated. 
However, in view of what respondent earnestly believes 
\Yas a misapprehension of facts by the court, it is 
believed that it will be helpful to the court, and to the 
cause of justice, to amplify the statement of facts with 
sorne additional specific references to the record of the 
testimony. 
By way of introduction may it be said, however, 
that this is an action by which appellants seek specific 
performance of an alleged contract for the sale of real 
property (oil leases) based upon a pro posed written 
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contract prepared and signed by respondent Anschutz 
Drilling Company and submitted to appellants, but 
never signed by appellants or delivered by them to 
respondent as required by the terms thereof, and with 
respect to which neither a certified check (as required 
by the terms thereof) nor cash (if cash is to be deemed 
the equivalent of a certified check) was ever delivered 
or tendered to respondent as required by the terms 
thereof. 
Turning now to the factual matters involved 
specifically in the petition for rehearing, the court, in 
page 2, first paragraph, of its mimeographed opinion, 
declares that "l\Ir. Alloway (appellants' agent for 
closing the contract) offered to sign the contract as it 
was." Again, in the fourth paragraph on the second page, 
the court finds and declares that "he, (Alloway) did 
offer to sign the contract and to pay the one-fourth of 
the money on behalf of plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) 
While we can understand how the state of the record 
may have mislead the court in this regard, as it is quite 
involved, it is respectfully submitted that there is 
absolutely no evidence to support any such finding of 
fact, or from \vhich any such finding of fact can be 
inferred. 
For the assistance of the court we shall try to 
outline all of the testi1nony on this 1nost i1nportant 
point. All of this evidence is found in the testilnony of 
Alloway. 
This \vas first mentioned at the trial in the testimony 
shown at page 55, line 20, to page 56, line 10, as follo\rs: 
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Q. (Continued by ~ir. Bayle) Did you make any 
offer to ~Ir. Lynch to sign the contract as it was 
prepared~ 
A. I was willing to sign it for Caldwell and 
Covington, as agent, and for myself individually. 
1IR. THATCHER: Object to it as not re-
sponsive and move it be stricken. 
THE COURT: The· answer may go out. 
Q. (Continued by Mr. Bayle) Did you sign it or 
agree to sign it~ 
A. Yes, I agreed to sign it. 
MR. THATCHER: Object to it as being a 
conclusion of the witness and not relating to any 
event. 
MR. BAYLE: Well, we will cure that, YOUR 
HONOR. 
Q. (Continued by Mr. Bayle) What did you tell 
1\Ir. Lynch in reference to signing the contract 
if anything? 
A. I told him my agency authority was limited 
to the agency agreement which I had taken from 
Caldwell and Covington. He expressed some 
concern about the performance part of the 
contract and that is when I agreed to be personally 
bound on the contract. (Emphasis added.) 
The next testimony which by any stretch of the 
imagination could be said to relate to the problem occurs 
on page 59, line 28, to page 60, line 8, in which ~Ir. 
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Alloway explains his loss of temper when Mr. Wakefield 
refused to accept Mr. Alloway's personal uncertified 
check, as follows : 
Q. Then what next occurred f 
A. Well, about 5 :15 I really lost my temper, 
which I have one, and I told Brother Wakefield, 
"If you are not bound, I am not bound." And 
Dennis Drake was present at the san1e time. 
Q. Then what did he do1 
A. Well, the thing that sort of spurred n1e on 
a bit, I suppose in anger, was Mr. Drake came in 
and said, "Well, that is tough". He said, "That 
is tough, that it didn't go throngh.JJ It was tough, 
because we were ready, willing and able to go 
through with it. (Emphasis added.) 
In this connection it should be observed that 
Alloway's testimony is that he and his principals were 
ready, willing and able to go through with the deal, not 
that he ever really comuz unicated that willingness or 
actually tendered tlze required acceptance and earnest 
money. A secretly entertained "\Yillingness of course can 
not affect the contracts of relationships of parties. 
The next fragment of testimony on this point is 
set out first on page 78, lines 20 to 26, of the transcript, 
where Allo"\Yay, under cross exa1nination, "\Yas atte1npting 
to explain a"\vay his sta ten1ent to respondent's represen-
tative at the close of negotiations (page 78, line 5) that 
•'If you're not bound, I am not bound." as follo,vs: 
Q. A1n I correct in assu1ning that "~hat you 1neant 
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then was that if one party was not bound by the 
contract, neither was the other party1 
A. Well, that was the 1neaning of it and the 
1ncaui11g being, if yo·u don't accept my check, 
zrll at is the point in signing the contract? 
The effect of this is that Alloway, when he found 
that hi~ personal uncertified check would not be accepted, 
and that the requiren1ent of a certified check (or perhaps 
its equivalent) would not be waived, felt insulted, became 
angry, and decided that if his personal check 'vas not 
to be accepted as the equivalent of a certified check, and 
and the contract proposed was not to be modified to that 
extent, then there was no point in him signing the 
contract, and hence he did not do so. 
The final mention of the question of whether or not 
there was ever any real tender of delivery of a signed 
contract appears on pages 83 and 84 of the transcript, 
\\'here the following exchange took place when counsel 
for appellants was attempting to lead his witness into 
testimony which would "plaster over" this hole in 
appellants' case : 
Q. Now, with reference to the contract, Exhibit 
3, ~Ir. Alloway, during your conversation with 
~Ir. Lynch, did you at any time tell him that you 
would sign that contract on behalf of Caldwell 
and Covington~ 
THE COURT: Now, this IS not proper re-
direct. 
~IR. BAYLE : No, I am asking it on direct 
examination. 
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MR. THATCHER: We submit it repetitious, 
YOUR HONOR. 
-(Tr. page 83, lines 21 to 30) 
1IR. THATCHER: If there is any doubt, it 
would probably be quicker to let him ans\Yer, 
if he can. 
THE COURT: You may answer. 
A. Yes, I handed him my check, meaning I was 
ready, willing and able to do it. The fact he 
would not take my check, I neglected to do it. 
-(Tr. page 84, lines 14 to 19) 
It is submitted that this is all the evidence there 
is on the question of whether there was an offer to sign 
the contract unchanged or \vhether there \Vas any tender 
of delivery thereof, as required by the tern1s of the 
written offer before it could be deemed accepted. 
Again, the court in its opinion states that the fact 
that Allo\vay "did offer to pay one-fourth of the rnoney 
on behalf of the plaintiff .... " (opinion page ~' 4th 
paragraph). Again at the paragraph continued at the 
head of page 3 of the opinion the court observes that 
Allo,vay's conduct as testified to by hin1 and sun1rnarized 
by the court supports plaintiffs' theory that plaintiffs 
"rnade a valid and bonafide offer to perforrn" \vithin 
the extended tin1e lirnit of the offer. 
It is respectfully submitted that neither the evidence 
or any reasonable inference thereon supports any finding 
of faet that there "·as any tender or offer of a certified 
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eheck, or of cash, if cash may be deemed the equivalant 
of the certified check upon the state of the present record. 
Here again \Ve shall attempt to present all of the 
evidence submitted by plaintiff on this point. 
There is no question but that Alloway did twice 
tender hi~ personal uncertified check, once to lVIr. Lynch 
( tr. 55) and once to l\Ir. Wakefield ( tr. 59). 
Also as possibly having some remote bearing on 
this question is the testimony already quoted from the 
transcript, page 60, that appellants were "ready, able 
and willing to go through with it (the contract)" but 
again it must be borne in mind that this willingness not 
only as regards the signing and delivery of the contract, 
but also as regards the payment of tender of the earnest 
n1oney which was required as a condition precedent, 
\\Tas not in any way communicated. Again (tr. 56, lines 
26 and 27) Alloway testified that "I asked him (Lynch) to 
go down to the bank with me," and that Lynch replied 
( tr. 57 line 5), "No, I won't go down there with you." 
Alloway further testified (tr. 57 lines 6 to 13) with res-
pect to Alloway's personal uncertified check as follows: 
Q. Then what did you do, if anything, in 
discussing the merits of the check that you had 
tendered to him~ 
A. I asked him to deposit it. I asked him to call 
the bank, if he didn't believe I had sufficient 
1noney or go down with me, either one. 
Q. \Vbat did he do~ 
A. He wouldn't do anything. 
Finally, on the second time through under examina-
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tion by counsel for appellants, the appellants' attorney-
agent, Mr. Alloway did testify (tr. 59, lines 11 to 16 
inclusive) as follows: 
Q. Now, when you were talking with l\Ir. Lynch, 
was there anything said about going to the bank 
and getting cash~ 
A. I tried to get him to cash the check, yes. 
Q. What did he say about that~ 
A. He said, "I can't accept cash." 
It must be noted again that this is in reference to 
1\Ir. Allo\vay's attempt to persuade respondent's 
representative JYir. Lynch to leave his office and go \vith 
Alloway to another place for the purpose of assisting 
Alloway in getting the cash in lieu of the certified 
check which the contract specifically required. 
There is no further evidence that \Ve are able to 
find, and not one scintilla of evidence that there \vas 
ever any tender of perforn1ance by plaintiff of the acts 
necessary to constitute an acceptance of respondent's 
offer. 
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. This court should have ruled that clear 
and convincing evidence is necessary to 1nake out ap-
pellants' case for specific performance. 
POINT 2. The respondent, having n1ade a si1nple 
offer to enter into a contract \vith appellants \Yas not 
required to leave that offer open for a reasonable time 
or any tiu1e, but \vas by la\v entitled to \vithdra\v the 
10 
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same at any time before effective acceptance caused the 
offer to ripen into a contract. 
POINT 3. There is no evidence to support the 
eourt's finding or ruling that appellants' agent offered 
to sign and deliver the contract for his principal. 
POINT 4. There is no evidence on which a finding 
could be based that performance of the requirements of 
the delivery of the signed contract and payment of the 
earnest rnoney required by the offer was either made or 
legally tendered .and refused. 
POINT 5. As there was no performance or tender 
of performance of the conditions requiring delivery of 
the signed contract and payment of the specified earnest 
n1oney, plaintiffs' proof of the alleged contract failed 
as a matter of law. 
ARGUl\fENT 
POINrr., 1. This court should have ruled that clear 
and convincing evidence is necessary to make out ap-
pellants' case for specific performance. 
While it is conceded that on appeal this court 
considers the evidence and every reasonable inference 
that may be derived therefrom in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff's theory of their case, when, as 
here, a dismissal is granted at the close of plaintiff's 
case at the trial, this rule, it is respectfully submitted, 
has a most limited and special application to cases like 
the one at the bar of this court, where proof of plaintiffs' 
(appellants') cause of action must be made by "clear 
and convincing evidence" as distinguished from '~a fair 
preponderance" of the evidence. 
11 
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On pages 21 and 22 of respondent's original brief 
herein it was, we believe, fairly and conclusively 
demonstrated that in this action for specific performance 
of an unsigned contract every element of plaintiffs' 
case must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence," 
and the Utah cases defining that very heavy burden of 
proof were cited. 
Apparently the court completely overlooked this 
most important point of law, for the court nowhere in 
its opinion mentions or refers to the controlling principal 
of law. It is respectfully submitted that this oversight 
led the court into inadvertent error in its failure to 
apply the rule to the evidence in this case. It is respect-
fully submitted that when no reasonable mind could say 
that plaintiffs' evidence below amounted to "clear and 
convincing" proof as defined in the law of Utah referred 
to, then the trial court, and this court on appeal, must 
rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs' case fails, even 
though with a lesser burden of proof, it nright be proper 
to submit the case to the trier of the facts. 
The failure of plaintiffs' evidence to 1neet this 
heavy burden, or even the ordinary burden, 'vill be 1nore 
fully discussed hereafter. It is therefore respectfully 
submitted that this court inadvertently erred in failing 
to recognize and apply the rule of la'v that plaintiffs' 
case must be proved here "'"ith ~'clear and convincing 
evidence," and that upon rehearing the error should be 
corrected. 
POINT 2. 11lze respondent, having nzade a sinzple 
offer to enter into a contract with appcllan.t was not re-
qu£red to leave that offer open for a reasonable t-ime or 
12 
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auy tin1e, but n·as by law entitled to withdraw the same at 
auy tinle vefore effective acceptance caused the offer to 
riJ)('JI into a contract. 
In its opinion (page 2, third paragraph the court 
says:) 
"'1,here is no question but that ~fr. Lynch, who 
was negotiating the contract for the defendants, 
could 'vaive the strict time requiren1ent. If he 
did so, the plaintiffs would then be entitled to 
a reasonable time to execute the contract and 
1nake the down payment." (Emphasis added.) 
We confess that we are somewhat reluctant to 
believe that court intended to say what this language 
apparently does say, namely: that a simple offer to 
contract to sell property without a specified time limit 
for acceptance, and even without the existence of an 
option contract bound by a consideration, 1nust be left 
open for a reasonable time and cannot be withdrawn 
by any action or con1munication until such time has 
lapsed. 
Indeed this language by the court seems to go even 
further than the intention of appellants, who in their 
brief (page 6) state their contention as follows: 
'"It is plaintiffs' contention that defendant should 
have given them a reasonable time in 'vhich to 
obtain a certified check to be presented as earnest 
1noney as they had accepted defendant's offer." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Whatever 1nay haYe been the court's intention in 
this regard, in the context of the record in this case, in 
13 
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which the trial court concluded 'that there was no 
evidence to support the allegation that the offer had 
been accepted, and in view of the language of the court 
in its opinion, in which the court speaks of the offeree's 
indication of a "willingness" to accept the offer, and 
the court's comments that a finding could be made that 
the offerees were "prevented from accepting the offer," 
the quoted language of the court is certainly susceptible, 
and almost seems to require the interpretation that a 
simple offer cannot be withdrawn before a lapse of a 
reasonable time, even though acceptance has not caused 
it to ripen into a contract. It is submitted that this is 
clearly not the la,v, and that if the contract had not been 
formed before Saturday morning of February 25, the 
respondent's withdrawal of its offer at that time 
was valid and effective. 
It is sub1nitted that the correct statement of the law 
concerning revoking of an offer before legal acceptance 
is discussed in respondent's original brief, pages 11 to 
13 inclusive, and in the authorities there referred to. We 
very respectfully observe that the court in its opinion 
does not refer to this argument, or to the authorities 
cited, from which, coupled \Yith the language used by 
the court, it would see1n there is a strong inference that 
the court overlooked this fa1niliar point of la\Y. 
As further authority for the position taken by the 
respondent that its offer 'vas revocable at any tune 
before actual acceptance, \Ve respectfully refer the court 
to, 
Corbin On Contracts, Section 38, 
the n1ore applicable portions of \Yhich are printed 
14 
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for the eourt's convenience in the Appendix hereof. 
rrhe quoted language froln the court's opinion would 
not be of ~uch great concern, perhaps, were it not for 
thP fa<'t that the court in its decision had directed a full 
trial of the issue, at which the opinion must be taken 
b.'· the trial court as the law of the case. If the trial court 
~hould aceept the apparent n1eaning of this language 
and rule that this court's opinion is that respondent's 
offer "\vas irrevocable until after the lapse of a reasonable 
tiine, this could only lead to further expense and to 
a second appeal. 
If this ruling stands, and a simple offer is henceforth 
to be irrevocable in Utah, the State's businesses are in 
for a rough time in their future dealings after this 
becomes knovvn. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the quoted 
ruling of the court is in error and should be corrected 
on rehearing. 
POINT 3. There is no evidence to support the court's 
finding or ruling that the appellants' agent offered to 
sign and deliver the contract for his principal. 
As indicated in the statement of facts, the court. 
8everal times indicated its belief that there was evidence 
to support the finding that Allo,Yay had "offered" to 
8ign and deliver the contract as required by the ternlR 
of the offer. As indicated in the transcript of the 
evidence, appellants' counsel several times tried to get 
the appellant's agent-attorney, 1Ir. Alloway, to testify 
to that fact, but each ti1ne ~Ir. Alloway, who as an 
attorney apparently had a careful regard for he truth 
15 
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and his duties to the courts, very carefully avoided 
making any such statement while he was testifying. Let 
us analyze this testimony, upon which the appellants' 
entire case rests. 
On page 55 of the transcript appellants' counsel asks 
Mr. Alloway the leading question "Did you make any 
offer to Mr. Lynch to sign the contract as it was 
prepared~" And Alloway carefully evaded the purport 
of the leading question by saying "I was willing to sign 
it .... " However even that ans"\Yer was striken by the 
court as shown by the transcript. 
It was then asked by Mr. Bayle "Did you sign it 
or agree to sign it~ And he replied "Yes, I agreed to 
sign it." However this was objected to, and was 
objectionable as being a conclusion of the witness and 
not relating to any event, and the validity of the object-
ion was tacitly conceded by counsel for appellant's who 
avoided a specific ruling on the objection by stating 
'
4Well, we will cure that, your Honor." Hence, there is 
still no proper testimony in the record to support any 
conclusion or inference that there was a tender or offer 
to sign and deliver the contract. 
In an effort to keep his pron1ise to cure the object-
ionable statement, attorney for appellant then asked the 
question in proper form: "What did you tell ~Ir. Lynch 
in reference to signing the contract if -anything·?" and 
the witness Alloway replied, HI told hin1 n1y agency 
authority "\vas li1nited to the agency agreen1ent 'vhich I 
had taken from c~ald,vell and Covington. He expressed 
son1e concern about the performance part of the con-
traet and that is "\vhen I agreed to be personally bound 
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on the contract." Here again :fiir. Alloway carefully 
avoided testifying that he offered to sign and deliver 
the contract or said anything about the signing and the 
delivery thereof. On the contrary he testified under 
oa ih that he connnunicated his interpretation of his 
agPncy authority as being limited so that (by necessary 
inference) he could not sign and deliver the contract as 
originally \Vritten, and further indicated in effect that 
he \\~ould take over the deal "personally." This of course 
he eould not do because the offer \vas not made to him 
and his ~~agreement" or offer to handle the contract 
versonally \vas certainly no tender of acceptance on be-
half of appellant, but rather a counter offer which ef-
fectively rejected respondent's original offer, if one can 
assu1ne that ~lr. Alloway was then acting as agent for 
appellants. 
The next scrap of evidence is found on page 60 of 
the transcrivt \vhere !\Ir. Alloway testified that a Mr. 
Drake can1e into the office and stated "Well, that is 
tough." The \vitness continued: '"He said, 'That is 
tough, because it didn't go through.' It was tough, be-
cause here \Ve were ready, willing and able to go through 
\\Tith it." The last sentence about being ready, willing 
and able \vas obviously the \vitness' volunteer comment 
on the situation, a conunent 1nade in court and not form-
ing any part of the transaction \vhich was the subject 
of the trial. 
Here again there is no evidence of any communica-
tion of readiness to perform the conditions required for 
acceptance of respondent's offer. 
The next fragment of evidence on this point is even 
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less helpful to appellants. It occurs in the transcript at 
page 78 in which the witness Alloway was explaining 
his parting statement to respondent's representatives , 
that "well, if you're not bound, I am not bound." The 
witness asserted that he meant that if one party was 
not bound by the contract, neither was the other party, 
and then made the additional volunteer statement "and 
the meaning being, if you don't accept my check, what 
is the point in signing the contract~" 
Here obviously Alloway's conscience was impelling 
him to tell the whole truth, even though he was anxious 
to help his principals. The purport of this testimony, in 
its context, is that he saw no point in signing or de-
livering the contract. It explained why he did not sign 
it or offer to sign it. He had neglected to get a certi-
fied check, although he could have done so had he acted 
promptly, and apparently it did not occur to him to 
bring cash to respondent's office, and hence there was 
no point, as he saw it at the time, in tendering perform-
ance of the requirement that the contract be signed and 
actually delivered to respondent before it could become 
binding. In other words, if the offer could not be modi-
fied to accept his personal uncertified check, he saw 
no point in signing and delivering the contract, although 
that also was required before there could be a meeting 
of the minds of the parties. This \Yas his mistake, not 
respondent's. 
The final shred of evidence on this point is on 
pages 83 and 84 of the transcript where Alloway was 
asked \vhether, in his conversation \Yith Mr. Lynch, he at 
any tin1e told 1\Ir. Lynch that he "would sign that contract 
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on behalf of Cald,vell and Covington~" And over an 
objection that it was repitious, later withdrawn, Alloway 
testified carefully, '~Yes, I handed him my check, meaning 
1 'H'as ready, 1cilling aud able to do it. The fact he would 
not take 1ny check, I neglected to do it." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
Here again the court will note that Alloway was 
trying hard to help his clients and still stay within the 
bounds of the truth. His bald testimony, shorn of its 
l~xplanations and excuses, was that he "neglected" to tell 
~Ir. Lynch that he 'vould sign the contract. Of course 
the contract \vhich is in evidence shows that it never was 
signed, and now the positive evidence is that there never 
\vas any offer of signing or any statement that he would 
sign it. Far fron1 permitting any inference that an offer 
\vas 1nade to supply this condition, the testimony of 
Allo\\·ay positively negatives any offer to sign the 
contract. Alloway's hopeful comment that he handed 
to Lynch his (uncertified) check "meaning I was ready, 
\villing and able to do it," of course can not overcome 
the clear and unequivocal testimony which follows that 
he never did tell Lynch he was willing to do it. Certainly 
Lynch could not be held to have inferred, from the 
handing him of an uncertified check, when a certified 
check (or possibly cash) \vas required, was "sign 
language" for "I a1n ready, willing and able to sign the 
contract as written not,vithstanding 1ny limitations of 
authority and notwithstanding the fact that I do not have 
the earnest 1noney and can not procure it." An uncertified 
check certainly "~as not any sign or indication of 
'villingness to deliver a signed contract, as required. 
It is respectfully submitted that from the above 
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evidence no inference can be drawn that any performance 
of the conditions or acceptance was made or tendered, 
or that there was even a simple offer to perform which 
was frustrated by respondent. 
With respect to the court's cormnent in its opinion 
that ''such business dealings must be carried on in good 
faith," and that "the plaintiffs (appellants) made a 
valid and bonafide offer to perform within a reasonable 
time as extended by defendant (respondent) but were 
prevented from doing so by the latters conduct," it is 
respectfully sub1nitted that the court misapprehended 
the purport of Alloway's testimony, which is all there 
is on the subject, and "\Vas thereby led into inadvertent 
error. There is not in all of the record one scintilla of 
evidence that respondent acted in bad faith in any 
respect, or that it or its agent did anything which would 
obstruct or prevent Alloway from signing and tendering 
delivery of the signed contract. On the contrary I\fr. 
Lynch's warning that there was another deal pending 
if this one "\vas not accepted is clear evidence, properly 
regarded, that respondent's officers, in good faith, had 
explained to 1\ir. Alloway 'vhy they were un'villing to 
modify their original offer, or to provide title guarantee, 
etc. or to accept Allo,vay's uncertified check 'vhich 'vas 
tendered to them, or to accept Alloway as a party to 
the contract on an offer made to the appellants. 
Allo"\\,.ay never clailned or stated, although several tin1es 
invited so to do, that he had made any offer of delivery 
of a signed contract, or of a certified check, or of cash, or 
that he "'"as prevented fron1 performing by any action of 
t hP respondents. His "?hole testin1ony is that he had neg-
lected to get the check certified "\vhile there 'vas yet time, 
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although he knew of this requirement, and that because 
his uncertified check was unacceptable he saw no point 
in atte1npting performance on the other condition of 
acceptance, and so neglected to perform or offer 
performance. 
It is submitted that appellants also must act in 
good faith, that they can not claim that there was a 
1neeting of the minds and a contract formed when the 
conditions prescribed for acceptance of the offer were 
not 1net by reason of the "neglect" of their agent, frankly 
ad1nitted, and positively testified to. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the court 
erred in holding that there is evidence which would 
support a finding that Alloway offered to sign and 
deliver the contract as written and was prevented from 
so doing by the bad faith actions of respondent. In 
this connection may we emphasize that Alloway's 
testi1nony \Yas that his neglect to tender performance in 
this regard was not caused by a statement that cash 
\Yas not acceptable, but was caused by the refusal to 
accept his uncertified check. Obviously no one can 
contend that respondent was bound to accept Alloway's 
uncertified check drawn on agency funds given him 
for another purpose. Such action would have involved 
respondent in liability for conversion of the funds. 
~\llo\vay \vas not able to pay \vithout violating his trust 
to another party whose money he had. 
POINT 4. There is no evidence on which a finding 
could be based tlzat performance of the requirements of 
deli eery of the signed contract and payment of the earnest 
nzouey required by the offer was either made or legally 
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tendered and refused. 
At the outset of this discussion we hope the 
court will not take it amiss if we comment that we 
believe it to be the law in America that free men can not 
be bound except by general law or by their contract 
completed on terms to which they assent at the time of 
the "meeting of the minds" of the parties. No man is 
required by law to enter into a contract, and it is a 
corollary of this basic principal of liberty that one 
making an offer may specify his own terms to suit his 
own ideas, even if they be crazy, and unless these terms 
are met, then there is no meeting of his mind, at least, 
and no contract, even though a by-stander (such as the 
court) can not see that the conditions he imposes are 
reasonable. One is entitled in a free country to impose 
unreasonable conditions if he wishes before he assents 
to being bound on a contract. In this connection re-
spondent imposed and communicated clearly a condition 
that it would not be bound unless a certified check was 
received by respondent. To make hun accept something 
other than the thing he has specified, at the option of 
so1neone else, is to deny him a liberty which the 
constitution and the law, as \ve understand it, guarantees 
to him, even though the court, and even though I might 
feel that he is being unreasonable in asking for a 
certified check instead of cash. Ho\vever that 1nay be the 
court did consider this point and ruled against respondent 
\vith respect to its privilege to insist upon a certified 
check before it could be bound by its own offer condition-
ed upon delivery of a certified check, and not otherwise. 
In principal, it is sub1nitted, there is little difference 
bet,vcen forcing an offeror to accept Blackacre in lieu of 
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his ~tipulated bargain for cash and forcing him to accept 
c..·otnnlon stoek;-; of known and equivalent market value, 
or the hand of the offeree's daughter in marriage. In 
eaeh case he is forced to accept a substitute for his stated 
bargain. l-Io\\·ever, as \Ve say, this was argued to and 
consideretl by the court, and we do not intend to 
belabor the point unduly. It would seem however that 
in principle the ruling sets a very dangerous precedent. 
\\;ith respect to the tender of the earnest money 
( \\'hich \Vas admittedly not paid), here again the 
appellant's case rests entirely upon the testimony of its 
agent ...:\.llo\vay, and here again Mr. Alloway, although 
carefully phrasing his answers in order to give as much 
co1nfort as possible to his principals, carefully refrained 
frou1 testifying that he ever tendered either a certified 
eheck or cash, (assuming without conceding that cash 
is the equi Yalent of a certified check in a contract 
situation). 
There is no question that he repeatedly tendered 
his uncertified check, but there is equally no question, 
and indeed appellants do not contend the contrary, that 
respondent "\vas not bound to accept Alloway's uncertified 
check as substantial con1pliance \vith its requirement for 
actual delivery of a certified check. The only question re-
lnaining is \vhether or not (assuming cash to be the equiv-
alant of a certified check) .AJlo,vay tendered cash for the 
earnest n1oney contract and \Vas refused. Mr. Alloway 
testified ( tr. page 59, lines 11 to 16) : HI tried to get 
hiln (Lynch) to cash the check, yes." And that Lynch 
replied HI can't accept cash." Alloway then testified 
that he asked Lynch to deposit his uncertified check or 
to call the bank if he doubted there \Vas sufficient money 
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on deposit to cover the same and that with respect to 
this also Lynch "wouldn't do anything." 
There is no other evidence with respect to the 
tender of the certified check required as earnest money, 
or the tender of any cash in lieu thereof. 
It is respectfully submitted that properly read, 
and even allowing every reasonable inference that may 
be derived therefrom, there is no showing whatsoever 
which would support a finding that the earnest money 
was ever tendered or effectively offered and refused. 
Even granting the assertion by the court that 
respondent must carry on its dealing in good faith, the 
utmost good faith does not require respondent to enter 
into a contract on terms to which it is unwilling to assent, 
and even more, it does not require respondent to perform 
any work or labor, or to travel, whether 50 miles or 50 
yards, or to do any other thing to aid and assist the 
offeror appellants to raise and to tender properly and 
legally the required earnest money. When an offer is 
made upon prescribed terms and conditions it is 
exclusively the problem of the offeree to make his 
arrangements to comply with specified conditions for 
the acceptance of the offer and the completion of the 
contract. To hold that an offeree has the right to require 
the offeror, or any other person, to go to work for him, 
or to travel for him or to do any other thing for hun to 
assist him in 1neeting the conditions and accepting the 
offer would be to i1npose involuntary servitude and 
slavery upon everyone 'vho atteu1pted to do business 
through a contract. It is respectfully sub1nitted that 
this is not the la,v, and that l\lr. Lynch "~as not required 
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to go to the bank to get either a certified check or cash 
but \\~as entitled to rely upon the effectiveness of the 
prescribed conditions that the earnest money would be 
.. received" by respondent at its office. 
In thi~ ('Onnection it rnust be noted that lVlr. Alloway 
never, in all his testilnony, claimed that he failed to 
~ign and deliver the contract because of 1Ir. Lynch's 
refusal to accornrnodate him by going to the bank, picking 
up the cash, and returning it at his risk. He testified that 
the reason he did not sign and deliver the contract 
y,~a~ that respondent's officers would not accept his 
uncertified check, and this made him angry and he 
therefore neglected to sign and tender the contract, but 
on the contrary declared "If you are not bound, I am not 
bound." If one is to speak of good faith, one should 
give so1ne consideration to a party who declares at the 
conclusion of the negotiations that neither party is 
bound, and then relies upon an alleged contract which 
is not signed. 
Let it be e1nphasized that Mr. Lynch never refused 
a tender of cash. His only refusal was a refusal 
of a request to go to the bank, which he was not 
bound to do, and his statement in this regard that he 
could not accept cash was not or is not a,dvanced as the 
reason for failing to proc1tre and bring the cash to the 
office and to tender it to hi11z. 1Ir. Allo,vay as an attorney 
surely kno,vs, and kne'v at the time, that no one is bound 
either to accept or reject cash, unless it is legally tendered 
to him. '~rhe requirements for a tender of cash, or of any 
other thing is considered on pages 16 and 17 of respon-
dent'~ original brief, but was apparently overlooked 
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by the court, as it is not referred to in the opinion. It 
would seem to require a ruling contrary to that reached 
in the opinion. 
The court seems to feel that the conduct above 
outlined, as reported through Alloway's testimony, 
would support an inference and a finding that 1\Ir. 
Lynch was "offered" the cash and refused it. It is 
respectfully submitted that this is not so. Generally, as 
shown in respondent's original brief a valid tender of 
1noney requires that the money be present, ready, 
produced, and offered to the person who is entitled to 
receive it. Our legislature has seen fit to relax this 
strict rule, but not to the extent that the court's opinion 
would relax it. Sec. 78-27-1, U.C.A. 1953, is as follows: 
"78-27 -1. An offer in writing to pay a particular 
sum of money or to deliver a written instrument 
or specific personal property, is, if not accepted, 
equivalent to the actual production and tender of 
the money, instrument or property." 
The relaxation of the ancient requirements of legal 
tender thus far, but no farther, shows a clear legislative 
intention to hold to the ancient common law· rules 
relating to tender of money required to be paid, or 
tender of the 'vritten instrument, except as specified in 
the statute. It n1ust be noted that the statute requires 
that the offer be in 'vriting, and that it be not accepted, 
or the offer is not the equivalent of a tender of 
delivery or pay1nent. Here no one ever testified or 
elain1ed that there "'"as ever any offer in "'Titing to pay 
ea~h or to pay a eertified check, or to deliver the signed 
contract. On the contrary the evidence is clearly to the 
~ ~ 
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contrary. No offer either orally or in writting was ever 
!Hade. ~or ean it be said from the evidence in the record 
that the eonduct of Ij~·neh prt~vented appellant's agent 
from tendering eash. Allo\\·ay is a licensed and practicing 
attorney, and n1ust be presu1ned to have known the 
effect of a tender of pay1nent upon an unwilling recipient. 
lie Yery earefully refrained from testifying that this 
state1nent by ~lr. Lynch prevented him from tendering 
ensh and his entire explanation is based upon his pique 
and anger resulting fro1n the slight given his personal 
uncertified check. If he had been misled thereby he, of 
eourse, 'vould have said so. It is unbelievable that he 
could have been misled, and it is submitted that 
reasonable minds can not differ in this regard in view 
of his skills and standing and his testimony. Certainly 
there is no "clear and convincing" evidence from which 
it could even be inferred that Lynch's statement prevent-
ed hiln from making a tender of cash and procuring 
for his principals the benefit of a proper legal tender. 
The most that can be said for his evidence is that he 
tried to "force" Mr. Lynch into waiving the conditions 
of his offer, and that 'vhen he found he could not, in 
vie'v of his own doubt about his authority to execute 
the contract without the changes, and when he found he 
could not protect his principals and himself by entering 
into the contract in his own name, he abandoned his 
efforts, declaring that neither party was bound . 
.L\s bet,veen two possible inferences, equally accep-
table, the trier of the facts can not be permitted to specu-
late, but as a matter of law he who has the burden of 
proof must fail on such a record, and this is particularly 
true w·here as here, the burden is to prove the case, and 
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every element thereof, by "clear and convincing" evidence. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the court 
erred in holding that the record discloses evidence which 
would support a finding of either a tender or an offer 
of delivery of the signed contract and payment of the 
required earnest money. This error should in law and 
justice be corrected. 
POINT 5. As there was no performance or tender of 
performance of the conditions requiring delivery of the 
signed contract and payment of the specified earnest 
money, plaintiffs' proof of the alleged contract fails as a 
matter of law. 
It would seem that little need be added on this 
Point 5, although it appears to be necessary for logical 
completness. A party can not be bound upon a contract 
1nerely because he did not "cooperate" with and assist 
the offeree in meeting prescribed conditions of accept-
ance, nor can he be bound upon a contract merely because 
he may have had an ulterior motive (such as a better 
deal in the background) for refusing to cooperate with 
and assist the offeree in perfecting the offeree's accep-
tance. Having made the offer he is entitled to insist 
upon strict performance with the conditions thereof, and 
he is further entitled to \Yithdra": the same at any time 
before the po\ver to create the contract by acceptance 
has heen completely and effectively exercised. It is only 
\Vhen this po\ver has been completely exercised that the 
contract results and either party becon1es bound, and 
clearly a secret "Tillingness to perform the conditions 
required by the offer is not an acceptance. Equally 
clearly, we sub1nit, neither is a 1nere 1nanifestation of 
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·trill ingness to exercise the power by meeting and perform-
ing the prescribed conditions. In this case, it is submitted, 
the record is clear that 1\Ir. Alloway never did exercise 
the po\ver which had been conferred upon his principals 
and that this po,ver was revoked not later than Satur-
d~1Y morning \vhen nir. Alloway was told that the land 
had been com1nitted to another party in as much as he 
had not concluded the contract the night before. In this 
connection we again respectfully subn1it to the court 
the citations in respondent's original brief with respect 
to offeree's power of acceptance and acceptance, and to 
Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 38, hereinbefore mentioned. 
It is respectfully submitted that upon the state of 
the record the law required the trial judge to grant 
the motion of dismissal and that the judgment entered 
thereon should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Honorable 
Court inadvertently erred in the particulars hereinbefore 
set out and that such errors should be corrected and that 
upon rehearing the opinion of the court should be with-
dra\vn and rewritten in accordance with the contentions 
contained herein and that the judgment of the trial court 
belo\v should be affirmed. 
Resp.ectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHE'R of 
Young, Thatcher and Glasmann 
JOHN C. BEASLIN 
and 
RICHARD L. SCHREPFERMAN 
of Holme, Roberts, More & Owen 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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APPENDIX 
Quotation from CORBIN ON CON'"rRACTS, Sec. 38: 
38. Offers Are Usually Revocable 
When one party makes an offer to contract w·ith 
another he creates a power of acceptance in that other; 
but also, except in the cases that are hereafter discussed, 
he retains a power of revocation and withdrawal. The 
method of exercising this power varies; usually it is by 
giving notice to the offeree. By exercising this power 
to revoke-by an effective revocation, the offeree's power 
of acceptance is terminated. After an acceptane has 
beome effective, there is no power in either party to re-
voke or withdraw. 
Even though the offeror states \vhen he makes the 
offer that the offeree shall have a definitely stated time 
in which to accept, or states that the offer will remain 
open for a definite time, the offer is nevertheless re-
vocable at the will of the offeror. An offer of this 
kind seems to be \vhat son1e business men n1ean by a 
"firm offer". There is an in1plied pron1ise not to revoke; 
but if the parties think that it is effective to deprive the 
offeror of the po\ver to revoke, they are mistaken. 
Not infrequently, especially in the case of a \vritten 
offer, it is expressly stated that it shall ~'not be subject 
to counter1nand." by this, no doubt the offeror under-
stands that he is pro1uising not to revoke the offer for 
the preseribed period, or for a reasonable time; and 
both parties 1nay believe that the offer is thereby n1ade 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
irrevocable. Nevertheless, there still remains a power 
to revoke. The express or implied promise not to re-
voke is not enforceable, unless it is under seal, or a con-
~ideration is given in exchange, or the offeree has 
ehanged his position in reliance upon it. The effect of 
these factors in Inaking an offer irrevocable is discussed 
hereafter . 
.1\ statement by the offeror that his offer will remain 
open for a specified time is not wholly inoperative, even 
though it does not deprive him of the power to revoke. 
Its effect is to determine exactly the duration of the 
po"·er of acceptance, in the absence of some new term-
inating factor such as a notice of revocation or a re-
jection. It makes no difference whether the stated 
ti1ne is unreasonably long or unreasonably short; it is 
nevertheless controlling, so that an acceptance after the 
expiration of the stated time is too late and an accep-
tance prior to such expiration is in time even though 
the contract is no\v very disadvantageous to the offeror. 
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